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Population ageing and inter-generational 
relation in the MENA: what role for social 
policy?
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Abstract: Declining fertility and rising life expectancy combined with migration are changing the demographic 
landscape of the MENA. Earlier high fertility however will ensure a growing population in the next 20-30 years. 
Family structure is also changing, it is becoming smaller and of nuclear type. The region has to manage a young 
age structure and a gradual ageing of population but with a potentially weaker traditional inter-generational 
support based on family, and varying and heterogeneous resource base and socio-economic structure of different 
countries. To maintain and improve inter-generational support within family and society in the MENA countries 
with large populations (such as Iran and Egypt) the most important challenges are poverty and vulnerability, 
unemployment, and development of long term plans for an ageing population. These are inter-connected 
objectives since reducing poverty and increasing current employment could provide individual and families 
with some resources to save and accumulate for old age. States in the region should put redistributive social 
polices in the areas of health, education and housing at the heart of a strategy of not only supporting family 
budget and resources to assist them in their inter-generational care, but also set up care and pension schemes 
for societal inter-generational support.  
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1. Introduction1
The demographic landscape of the MENA region has 
been going through fundamental changes in the past 
few decades with very important implications for the 
economic and polity of the region. The main drivers of 
this demographic change have been declining fertility 
and migration. Earlier high fertility rates led to growth 
in the ‘youth bulge’ (the percentage of those of 15-24 
years of age in population) in early 21st century that 
1  This paper draws on author’s earlier works on population 
ageing (Messkoub, 1999), employment and poverty in the MENA 
(Messkoub, 2009), and ageing and inter-generational relation-
ship (Messkoub, 2013). The author is grateful to three anony-
mous referees and the editors of the journal for their comments 
on an earlier draft. The remaining errors are, alas, mine!
has since been on a declining trend, yet the number 
of young people is projected to increase in most MENA 
countries. But in Algeria, Iran and Tunisia the number 
of young people is projected to decrease. (Assaad and 
Roudi-Fahimi, 2007) All in all the gradual decline of 
fertility in the MENA is inevitably leading to population 
ageing. Another major demographic development in 
the region has been large-scale migrations both within 
and from outside the region, mostly in response to 
imbalances in the MENA labour markets. 
Demographic transition provides predictable and 
important challenges to the economic and polity of a 
country. Decline in fertility and the gradual increase 
in the working age population opens a demographic 
window – availability of a young labour force – that 
if complemented by job creating investment could 
put the country on a self-sustaining path of economic 
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growth and prosperity. This has been the experience 
of many of the newly industrialised countries in Asia 
and Latin America. On the other hand the gradual 
increase in the number and share of the elderly 
population will create new demands on the society. 
Whilst the resource base of a country is the starting 
point of any analysis of the long-term impact of the 
demographic transition, it is social and economic 
structure combined with the state policy and civil 
society engagement that determines how any society 
would meet the challenges of demographic transition. 
These challenges are intrinsically inter-sectoral, 
both in terms of economic sectors of agriculture, 
industry and services as well as social sectors of 
health, social protection and care of the elderly. For a 
comprehensive approach we need to take note of the 
inter-sectoral issues, which would also help with the 
cost, and efficiency of service delivery and support to 
the target groups. 
The backdrop to the changing demography of 
MENA is the complex set of countries in the region 
that have to develop social and economic policies 
in the next 30 years if they were to be prepared for 
the challenges of population ageing, migration and 
intergenerational support. 
This paper is concerned with the social and 
economic implications of main demographic 
developments in the region focusing on social policy 
issues such as support for an increasing number 
of older people, inter-generational support and 
relationships which is contingent on household 
resources and gainful employment of the younger 
working age population; and social protection of the 
poor and vulnerable since poverty affects both the 
elderly and households who are expected to provide 
some care for them. 
Such policies have to take note of the differing 
resource base of the MENA countries and the speed 
with which demographic changes are taking place 
and how certain developments like fertility decline 
are becoming a structural feature of the region, whilst 
other developments like international migration are 
market driven and could be subject to fast moving 
policy changes.
2. Demographic transition and 
population ageing in the MENA
The experience of demographic transition varies 
across the region, with different countries being at 
different stages of their transition. Earlier mortality 
decline followed by fertility decline have led to a 
gradual decline in the rate of population growth in the 
region that however varies across countries. (Roudi-
Fahimi and Mederios, 2007) Yet earlier high growth 
of population has resulted in a young age structure 
(those in 15-24 age group constitute about 20 per 
cent of population in the region) that has ensured a 
growing population despite a declining fertility rate 
across the region. By 2050 most countries in the region 
are forecast to have anywhere between 1.3 to 1.7 times 
more people than in 2007. Life expectancy in most 
countries in the region has also increased and ranges 
between 70 and 73 years. (UN, 2013) The median 
age is increasing from 25 years in 2015 to 32 years in 
2050 in the North African countries of MENA with the 
corresponding figures for the MENA countries located 
in the Western Asia being 29 and 37 (see Table 1).
At the same time we should expect an increase 
in the number of the elderly (those of 60 years of age 
and over) as well as an increase in their share in the 
population. Most recent UN population projections 
estimates that number of elderly will increase from 
18 million in 2015 to 59 million in 2050 in the North 
Africa MENA countries and from 24 million to 96 
million in the Western Asia MENA. (Ibid.) To complete 
the trends in ageing let us take a snap shot view of the 
percentage of elderly in total population in the region. 
Figure 1 shows that the percentage of the elderly in 
total population is increasing in the MENA region. In 
the North African MENA countries the percentage of 
elderly increases from 8 in 2015 to 16.7 in 2050, whilst 
in the Asian MENA countries the increase is from 5.4 in 
2015 to 19.0 in 2050. In general, the richer the country 
the higher the percentage of the projected the elderly 
in total population. It is important to note that by 
2050 the age structure of the richer MENA countries 
resembles those experienced currently by the highly 
developed countries which started their demographic 
transition earlier, at higher level of economic 
development and with more developed welfare and 
health policies. However, the MENA countries do have 
time on their side to develop the necessary welfare 
infrastructure in support of their elderly population in 
the future. 
Changes to family formation and migration are 
the other notable demographic developments in the 
region. The age at first marriage has increased and so 
has the use of modern contraceptives that has led to a 
reduction in family size. The age at first marriage has 
increased in most MENA countries from 18-21 years 
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Table 1. Population 60 years of age and over and Median Age, MENA region, 2015 and Projections 2030, 2050 (Source: Author’s 
compilation based on UN (2015). Table A.III.1, p. 122.) 
Country/
Region 
Population age 60 & over (,000) Percentage aged 60 & over Median Age (years)
2015 2030 2050 2015 2030 2050 2015 2030 2050
Northern Africa 17,992 30,792 59,066 8.1 10.9 16.7 25.1 27.7 32.2
Algeria 3,573 6,413 12,988 9.0 13.3 23.0 27.6 31.9 37.1
Egypt 7,238 11,593 23,045 7.9 9.9 15.3 24.7 26.5 31.0
Libya 439 894 1,823 7.0 12.0 21.8 27.5 31.8 38.4
Morocco 3,317 6,012 10,239 9.6 15.1 23.4 28.0 33.1 38.6
Sudan 2,081 3,633 7,406 5.2 6.4 9.2 19.4 22.3 26.2
Tunisia 1,314 2,247 3,565 11.7 17.7 26.5 31.2 36.5 40.4
Asia 24,395 46,235 95,766 7.6 11.8 20.4 26.3 30.7 36.6
Iran 6,502 12,745 28,754 8.2 14.4 31.2 29.5 38.3 44.7
Bahrain 53 178 432 3.9 10.8 23.7 30.3 35.6 42.2
Iraq 1,817 3,162 7,402 5.0 5.8 8.8 19.3 21.1 24.3
Israel 1,278 1,808 2,758 15.8 18.1 21.9 30.3 31.8 35.2
Jordan 414 782 1,853 5.4 8.6 15.8 22.5 26.3 32.4
Kuwait 133 442 1,188 3.4 8.9 20.1 31.0 33.9 37.8
Lebanon 670 1,014 1,726 11.5 19.2 30.8 28.5 37.6 46.8
Oman 196 494 1,434 4.4 9.4 24.5 29.0 34.2 40.1
Qatar 51 221 633 2.3 7.9 19.8 30.7 34.0 41.0
Saudi Arabia 1,582 4,324 9,610 5.0 11.1 20.9 28.3 32.3 38.2
Palestine 211 421 1,014 4.5 6.2 10.4 19.3 22.3 27.4
Syria 1,191 2,556 5,740 6.4 8.9 16.4 20.8 27.2 33.7
Turkey 8,828 14,911 25,530 11.2 17.0 26.6 29.8 35.2 41.8
UAE 215 1,238 3,004 2.3 11.3 23.5 33.3 36.6 43.4
Yemen 1,254 1,939 4,688 4.7 5.3 9.9 19.3 23.0 29.6
Note: Median ages for Asia are our calculations based on geometric means.  
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Figure 1. Percentage of population 60 years and over in total population, 2015, 2030 and 2050 in the MENA region. (Source: 
Table 1.)
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in the 1970s to 22-25 by the late 2000. Another factor 
affecting fertility is that a large number of women 
are postponing marriage to their late 30s. (Roudi-
Fahimi and Mederios, 2007, EU,2017) The increase 
in the average age and postponing of marriage has 
been attributed to the rise in the level of education 
of women, their autonomy and agency, as well as the 
rising cost of setting up a home, due to the property 
price inflation, high unemployment among the young 
people and high incidence of poverty among the 
working population. (Ibid.)
Family size in the region has decreased to 5.4 
in urban and 6.1 in rural areas. Several factors may 
well account for this. The decrease in family size is 
associated with the increase in the education of the 
head of family. Moreover, family size is even smaller 
in nuclear families – 4.7 persons per nuclear family. 
Nuclear families comprise 85 per cent of all families 
in the region. A further development is the number 
of children per family. In urban areas there are 2.4 
children per family and in rural areas 3, that again 
declines with the increase in the education of the 
head of family. In the foreseeable future the family 
size is going to be stable given the combined effects 
of declining mortality and fertility moving in the 
opposite direction. (See Table 2) These developments 
combined with the rising age of marriage and high 
youth unemployment ensures that there would be 
more adults at home, resulting in a stable dependency 
ratio. (Bongaart, 2001)
These changes are in line with the developments 
in other parts of the world. The trend towards smaller 
families in developing regions follows the pattern 
observed in the developed countries in the 19th century, 
that has been attributed to adoption of some older 
methods family planning, urbanization (associated 
with lower fertility and mortality over time), 
‘modernisation’ of life style and the move towards 
nuclear families, and above all the development of 
capitalism and its associated work patterns and family 
formation. (Bongaart, 2001, and Seccombe, 1983)
As far as migration is concerned, its size and 
direction crucially depends on the resource base of 
country and labour market conditions. The main 
direction of migration has been from poor MENA 
countries, the Indian sub-continent and the Far East 
to the rich MENA countries. In the MENA region as 
elsewhere in the world, national and international 
migration has always been part of the household 
strategy to improve the life chances of its members. 
Table 3 provides a snap shot view of migration in 
MENA. MENA countries can be divided into several 
groups based on their natural and human resources. 
(Cammett, et al., 2015)  Almost all poor and labour 
abundant countries have sent large number of 
migrants to other countries, as indicated by the 
negative net migration figures. The reverse is true for 
labour deficit countries that have recorded positive 
net migration.
In concluding this section several observations 
are in order. Demographic changes are taking place 
in the MENA region at a very fast pace – families are 
getting smaller, more families are of nuclear type, 
and less children are borne. In resource poor, labour 
abundant countries poverty is a major problem for a 
large section of population. Migration has been an 
important part of family and individual strategy to 
cope with poverty and improving life chances for the 
family and individual. 
The question is how these developments are going 
to affect the care and support of an ageing population. 
The answer lies in the balance between inter-
Table 2. Family size and number of children in developing regions by area of residence and education of head of family. (1980s)
Residence Head of family Education
Urban Rural None Primary Secondary
Family Size Asia 4.9 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.2
L. America 4.6 5.0 4.7 5 4.4
Near E./N.Africa 5.4 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.0
S.S. Africa 5.1 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.0
Number of 
Children
Asia 2.0 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.3
L. America 1.9 2.5 2.1 2.3 1.9
Near E./N. Africa 2.4 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.3
S.S. Africa 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.5
Source: Adapted from Bongaarts (2001), table 4.
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generational support in terms of the demographic 
balance between generation within the family and 
society at large, and inter-generational support 
through the sharing and distribution of resources 
within family and society. In the final analysis it is the 
availability and distribution of resources within the 
family and in the society that determine how a society 
can manage demographic ageing.
Table 3. Net migration in MENA, 1995-2010.
Country 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010
Bahrain  19  25  448
Iran  687  126 - 186
Iraq - 18 - 580 - 150
Israel  245  103  274
Jordan - 188 - 94  203
Kuwait  125  162  278
Lebanon 0  100 - 13
Palestine  70 - 190 - 90
Oman - 229 - 50  153
Qatar  43  170  857
Saudi Arabia - 877 1 726 1 056
Syria - 130  548 - 56
Turkey - 150 - 100 - 50
UAE  469  780 3 077
Yemen - 100 - 100 - 135
Northern Africa -1 862 -1 667 -1 020
Algeria - 140 - 140 - 140
Egypt - 946 - 371 - 347
Libya - 20 - 20 - 20
Morocco - 500 - 614 - 675
Sudan - 227 - 532  135
Tunisia - 56 - 81 - 20
Western Sahara  27  90  48
Source: Adapted from: UN (2013) World Population 
Prospects: The 2010 Revision. New York: UN Population 
Division.
3. Ageing and family: poverty 
and vulnerability
Welfare in old age is based on combination of own 
resources – income from labour, assets (including 
own pension savings such as life insurance and 
annuity), family support in kind and in cash and 
institutional support from the state and employers 
in the form of state and work-based pensions, health 
cover and other benefits. The relative contribution of 
the above sources varies greatly in the MENA region, 
where family still is the main source of support for the 
majority of the elderly.
But do families have the resources to look after 
their older members? The simple answer is that they 
do not have sufficient resources, but continue to do so 
out of familial and humanitarian solidarity at a cost to 
themselves. Family support is becoming particularly 
taxing where as noted in the previous section family 
size is decreasing. Moreover, many families in the 
resource poor, labour abundant countries are too 
poor to comfortably manage the care of their elder 
members. The situation is no better among the poor 
in the resource rich MENA countries. The evidence 
comes from data on poverty and vulnerability.
The heterogeneity of the MENA is also reflected 
in the incidence of poverty and vulnerability in 
different countries. Using the headcount poverty 
measure of a-dollar-a-day (or more) poverty is rife in 
the labour abundant and resource poor countries. But 
poverty is also present in the large resource rich and 
industrializing countries of Iran and Algeria (Iqbal, 
2005, Messkoub, 2008). The incidence of poverty 
however is very sensitive to the head count poverty 
rate. For example in Egypt it increases from less than 
5 per cent of population at a-dollar-a-day to above 40 
per cent at two-dollar-a-day. (Iqbal, 2005, p. 18) More 
recent data from other MENA countries also support 
the sensitivity of poverty to head count poverty rate. 
The World Bank data reveals that the percentage of 
people below poverty line increases dramatically from 
below 3 per cent at $1.90 a day in Morocco and Tunisia 
to around 15 and 8 per cent, respectively, at $3.10 a 
day. (World Bank, 2015) The other aspect of poverty 
is its regional spread. In all countries referred to in 
Iqbal’s (2005) study, rural headcount poverty rates are 
higher in rural areas than in urban areas. 
What these figures demonstrate is that a simple 
focus on head count poverty rates misses millions 
who are above the poverty line and very vulnerable 
to small shocks to their meager resource base. This 
suggests that some indicator of vulnerability should 
complement traditional headcount poverty rates 
when it comes to the assessment of inter-generational 
support and social policy design. Social policy 
measures in the MENA region in support of the elderly 
have to be focused on vulnerability of population 
rather than just on the poor. 
An important aspect of vulnerability is low return 
to labour and precarious employment conditions. 
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Employment as a major source of family income 
has come under great stress in recent years. In 2010, 
unemployment in the MENA region was about 10 
per cent and the figure for women was 15 per cent. 
Youth unemployment is high in the region. In  2010, it 
stood at 27 per cent, with the figure being even higher 
among the educated youth. Female unemployment, 
in particular among the educated, is quite high: 40 
per cent. Youth unemployment is not confined to 
the MENA region and many countries in Europe have 
record figures since the financial crisis of 2009. For 
example, Spain registered a youth unemployment 
rate of 46 per cent in 2012, Greece, 42 per cent and 
Cyprus 20 per cent. (ILO, 2012) But the distinguishing 
characteristic of youth unemployment in MENA is 
the fact that it has been high well before the financial 
crisis and is a structural feature of the labour market 
in the region. Job creation has hardly kept pace with a 
rising youth population as they enter the labour force. 
(Messkoub, 2009, Dhillon and Yousef, 2009, Sayer and 
Yousef, 2016) Both public and private sectors have 
been unable to create sufficient jobs for the growing 
number of youth entering the labour market, that 
most recent studies argue are due to the mismatch 
between demands for and supply of skilled labour as 
well as labour market regulations. (Sayer and Yousef, 
2016) These studies call, inter alia, for changes in the 
educational systems that put more value on acquisition 
of credentials/degrees than skill development, whilst 
reforming labour market regulations in order to 
facilitate hiring rather than just making it easier to 
lay people off, and by providing incentive structure to 
boost demand for labour by the private sector. (Ibid.,) 
However, such reforms take time to implement whilst 
there are the pressing needs of the poor unemployed 
people and the working poor.
In absence of no or very meager unemployment 
benefit in most MENA countries poor people cannot 
‘afford’ to be unemployed. The working poor are 
a sizable proportion of the working population. In 
late 1990s working poor accounted for 12 per cent of 
working population in Tunisia, with the figure rising 
to 30 per cent in Algeria, and staggering figures of 71 
per cent in Egypt and 74 per cent in Yemen. (See table 
4) The reasons for why people remain poor despite 
their hard work are varied and complex. Unequal 
distribution of assets and power play an important 
role in holding back the working poor from claiming 
their just and fair share of what they produce. Many 
small farmers do not have access to sufficient land or 
other agricultural inputs to improve their productivity. 
The self-employed people in urban areas often lack 
the resources to expand and improve their operations. 
In short low productivity is at the heart of low return 
to labour in many sectors. At the same time weak 
trade unions and poor implementation of labour laws 
do not empower workers to ask for higher wages and 
better conditions. Absence of or low minimum wage 
is another reason for the low return to labour in many 
countries.
Table 4. Working Poor as a proportion of working population in 
selected MENA countries  (late 1990s)
Country Working Poor%
Yemen 74
Egypt 71
Algeria 30
Morocco 23
Jordan 13
Tunisia 12
Source: ILO (2012)
The importance of employment and secure return 
to labour (whether it is termed a decent wage or 
a living income) cannot be over-estimated. What 
is needed above all is an employment policy that 
puts the emphasis on strengthening the growth-
employment nexus by promoting job creation and 
improving the access of the poor to such jobs. At the 
same time more targeted poverty reduction policies 
are needed that should not only improve the income 
earning opportunities of the poor but also raise their 
incomes.  Anti-poverty policies should also be put in 
place to provide support for a large number of people 
who are just above poverty line and thus vulnerable 
to poverty in case of minor deterioration in the 
macroeconomic conditions or their poverty stricken 
household economy. MENA countries that have been 
successful in tackling poverty and vulnerability 
have relied on a range of policies: macroeconomic 
stability, pro-poor short-term employment policies 
(through labour intensive public work projects and 
by focusing on sectors where poor are concentrated) 
and improving opportunities for the poor in order 
that they would benefit from employment growth 
(improving ‘inerrability’ of the poor).2 These countries 
2  For a detailed discussion of the ‘growth-poverty-nexus’ see 
Messkoub (2009) 
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have also improved the health, education, housing 
and sanitary conditions of the poor by increasing 
social expenditure, and by putting in place income 
support measures and maintaining subsidies on 
goods consumed by the poor. Finally successful 
anti-poverty policies have also improved the poors’ 
access to financial (through micro finance) and other 
productive resources such as land.
But it is the structural reasons for low return 
to labour that should be of most concern to policy 
makers. Unequal distribution of land, low skills, low 
capital investment, inefficient and often outdated 
technology will all lead to low productivity and low 
return. The financial and banking sector is also not 
geared to the needs of the small producers and the self-
employed poor people. The micro-credit ‘revolution’ 
that was supposed to fill this gap has hardly changed 
the fortune of the great majority of the poor. What 
is needed is to tackle the problems of unequal 
distribution of power and assets that requires some 
fundamental political changes and more commitment 
by the state to improve education and skill levels as 
well as helping to upgrade technology in agriculture 
and industry.
It should be clear that most families do not have 
adequate resources to meet their needs and provide 
adequate inter-generational support. Given the 
chronic and structural poverty in the labour abundant 
and resource poor countries inter-generational 
support has to go beyond families and take the broader 
perspective of societal inter-generational relations. 
In the labour deficit and resource rich countries the 
issue of inter-generational support within families 
poses several problems that again calls for a societal 
approach to inter-generational relationship. The first 
is the issue of income inequality in these countries. 
Only the small and very rich oil and gas producing 
countries can maintain sufficiently high-income 
transfers to, as well as providing high level of health 
and educational services, for their nationals to ensure 
adequate inter-generational support by families. In 
most of the larger oil exporting countries (e.g. Iran 
and Algeria) inequality in the distribution of income 
and assets, unemployment and inadequate public 
services have for long been the main reasons for 
public discontent. 
Lack of or inadequate democratic structure and 
governance to ensure accountability, participation and 
transparency have also seriously limited the voice and 
the negotiating power of the majority of population 
in MENA. Finally, there is the all important issue of 
the rights of international migrants who have been of 
critical importance to the economy of labour deficit 
countries, and would become even more important 
in the future as population ages in these countries.  It 
is no exaggeration to state that the inter-generational 
support in areas of health, education, housing and 
care, to name but a few, in labour deficit countries 
cannot be maintained without the availability of 
migrant labour. It is in this context that we turn to 
societal inter-generational support and social policy. 
4. Social policy, families and 
inter-generational support 
At micro-level family is the main channel through 
which various types of inter-generational support 
are provided, that contributes to production and 
re-production of labour at micro and macro levels. 
Families however are not homogenous and are divided 
along social and economic lines that determine their 
capacity to provide inter-generational support. As 
noted earlier given the high incidence of poverty in 
many of the MENA countries and inadequacy of family 
resources there is a need for social policy measures 
that would supplement family resources and support 
the broad developmental agenda and ensure societal 
inter-generational support. 
The most basic objective of any state intervention 
is to maintain and increase families’ resource base. In 
this context state intervention for inter-generational 
support could be linked to market for: goods (e.g. 
provision of necessities such as health, education, 
housing and basic food stuff), labour (e.g. job creation 
and labour issues) and money (e.g. provision of credit 
for businesses).
More specifically family budget constraint will 
be improved by first de-commodifying (through 
regulation and intervention in the market) the 
basic necessities of life. De-commodification does 
not necessarily mean free provision of goods and 
services.  It could take different forms like rent control, 
subsidized medicine and staple food, free primary 
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schools, free vaccination, etc.3 Second, by improving 
the human capital of family through improved health 
and education, employability and income earning 
opportunities of families will increase. Third, by 
maintaining labour demand through job creation by 
private and public sector and increasing labour force 
participation of women families will have more secure 
earning opportunities through employment. 
Implementing the above policies would depend 
on the resource base of different countries. The 
resource rich and labour short countries obviously 
have an advantage over the others by having large 
foreign exchange reserves and no financial constraint 
to finance universal welfare programmes. The issue of 
inter-generational support is not a problem, neither 
at family nor at national level for these countries. 
Despite the existence of some youth unemployment in 
these countries, family resources and state spending 
are sufficient to maintain good standard of living for 
the young. But problems of these countries is rooted 
in their demography – they are short of labour to 
maintain and develop their economies almost in all 
sectors and skill levels, a gap that is filled by immigrant 
labour. With investment in education and skills in 
these countries, it is hoped that the shortage of skilled 
labour may somewhat be lessened but in other areas 
labour shortages will continue, particularly in the 
care, construction and service sector. It would also be 
expected that demographic transition and population 
ageing will increase the need for inter-generational 
support, that with the most likely increase in the 
labour force participation of women, would generate a 
demand for migrant labour. In short inter-generational 
support in resource rich, labour deficit countries will 
require a stable and steady flow of migrants. 
Whether this demand for migrant labour will 
be fulfilled depends on the demographic situation 
and economic development in the labour abundant 
MENA and the Asian countries (e.g. Bangladesh, 
Nepal, India, Philippines) that have been sending 
migrants to the MENA region for decades. However, 
demographic transition is already underway in many 
of the emigration countries that if combined with their 
3  De-commodification however has to be put in the context of 
the existing subsidies some of which like those to fuel and ener-
gy may well benefit the higher income groups. There are also 
implicit subsidies low exchange rate and low interest rates that 
again could benefit higher income groups more than others. The 
reform of such subsidy structure has to be combined with de-
commodification/subsidy structure that would benefit the lower 
income groups. 
steady economic development would increase the 
demand for labour and improve pay and conditions. 
That in trun would lower the propensity to migrate to 
the labour deficit MENA countries. To ensure a steady 
flow, the migrant receiving countries have to change 
their migration policy that would not only improve 
pay and conditions for the low skill migrants but 
also introduce some flexibility in the labour market. 
The current ‘guardianship’ (‘kefalat’) system that ties 
the immigrant to the sponsoring or ‘guardian’ (‘kafil’) 
employer has led to labour market segmentation 
(defined as a market divided by non-competing 
groups) in labour deficit countries, where citizens 
and nationals as well as high skilled migrant workers 
have far more rights and enjoy better living standards 
than the low skilled migrants working in construction, 
service and other sectors. 
What is needed is an integrated labour market 
where labour law and rights could be applied to all 
in order to improve pay and conditions of immigrant 
labour. This would improve the flexibility in the 
labour market and stabilise the migrant labour and 
bring the labour deficit countries closer to some of the 
best practices in other countries. Moreover, the labour 
deficit countries should also plan for permanent 
immigration in order to solve their long-term labour 
imbalance. It is highly unlikely that the labour deficit 
countries can close the gap between their labour 
demand and national labour supply in the near 
future considering their demographics. One of the 
best policies in the area of immigration is admitting 
migrants on the basis of skill shortages that would give 
the right to enter and reside temporarily that could in 
due course lead to long-term residency.
The next group of countries to consider is resource 
rich and labour abundant countries. These countries 
have experienced improved human development for 
their nationals through basic programme in the areas 
of health, education, subsidized food, etc. The scope 
and scale of such provisions, however, vary greatly 
across different countries, that is dependent on high 
oil prices. Ensuring that families can fulfill their 
inter-generational support in resource rich labour 
abundant countries governments have to maintain 
the real income of families by controlling inflation 
and cost of two major items of expenditure – housing 
and curative health care. This calls for prudent 
expenditure of the oil money in the country to avoid 
inflationary pressure, and partial de-commodification 
of health and housing. Another major concern in the 
medium term is high youth unemployment in these 
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countries that requires active job creation policies, 
involving both public and private sector.
Resource poor and labour abundant countries 
face many more hurdles than the other groups. 
Their human development varies greatly across 
social classes, with the richer classes enjoying better 
standard of living and higher human development. 
These countries face chronic foreign exchange 
constraints and fiscal problems that would limit their 
policy space to carry out much needed social policy 
measures in areas of health and education. Like 
elsewhere in the MENA region, they also suffer from 
high youth unemployment.  How have families in 
these countries coped with their low living standards, 
poverty and vulnerability?
As noted earlier, migration to richer countries 
in the region and beyond has helped to improve 
living standards for migrant sending families. 
Remittances have been an important contributor to 
family income and a source of foreign exchange for 
the government. Considering the level of poverty and 
high unemployment in the migrant sending countries 
families have limited scope for inter-generational 
support, without relying on state subsidies to basic 
foodstuff, education and health. Social policy 
measures in these countries to ensure family based 
and societal inter-generational support are no 
different from the resource rich and labour abundant 
countries, except that their needs are bigger and their 
finances more limited.
However, states could still do a lot in the 
resource poor countries by focusing on some key 
areas like universal and free preventive and primary 
health care, as well as school level education, and 
de-commodification through intervention in the 
market for curative health care, housing and higher 
education. 
Job creation and job protection should also be on 
the agenda. Whilst state in the resource poor countries 
have a lot less economic power than in the resource 
rich countries, they nevertheless can contribute to 
job creation by providing support to the private sector 
through appropriate tax and subsidy policies, and by 
training and educating the work force to meet the skill 
needs of the private sector. 
An important legacy of the MENA is the 
historical, cultural and linguistic links in the region. 
For centuries and well before the emergence of the 
nation state, people in the MENA region interacted 
through trade and migration. Common religions and 
languages should also help to bring the MENA region 
together. These links do give a regional dimension to 
the issue of inter-generational support. Migration and 
remittance flows demonstrate that inter-generational 
support already relies on regional economic linkages. 
Yet, by all accounts, the region is very poorly 
integrated. Regional trade accounts for less than 10 
percent of total trade in the Arab MENA, with the 
Maghreb countries having the lowest share of intra-
regional non-oil merchandise trade. Low regional 
integration, according some studies, has led to the 
potential loss of 1-2 per cent growth of GDP. Higher 
GDP growth is particularly important for creating jobs 
for the 20 million or so unemployed people in the 
region and for the new comers who enter the labour 
market at an annual rate of 3.4 per cent. (World Bank, 
2013, see also Hakimian and Nugent, 2004) 
Strengthening existing regional links in relation 
to migration and labour mobility could contribute to 
inter-generational support. This could be helped by 
the integration of labour market across the region, 
initially by reducing regulation in hiring non-
nationals, and by de-politicising migration of labour. 
The future generations are going to live in the same 
region and regional economic cooperation is needed if 
inter-generational support were to continue.
5. Conclusion
Demographic map of the MENA is changing fast. 
The region is in the early stages of a demographic 
transition. On the one hand earlier high fertility has 
resulted in the current youth bulge. On the other, 
gradual fertility decline and lower mortality is leading 
to an ageing population. A youth bulge provides the 
region with a demographic window if the young and 
increasingly educated labour force of MENA were 
to be utilized productively. The current high youth 
unemployment in the region reveals that job creation 
and labour demand has lagged far behind the labour 
supply in the region; that in part is due to the low 
employment elasticities of different sectors.
This overall picture however masks great variation 
across the region. Youth unemployment in labour 
abundant resource poor countries is matched by 
labour shortages in some of the resource rich countries 
that have to rely on migrant labour to fulfill their 
labour demand. It is in this context that regional and 
international migration has to enter the demographic 
debate and anti-poverty strategies in the region. 
Demographic transition also involves a gradual 
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increase in the number and share of the elderly in the 
population in the coming years. Population ageing is 
not as urgent a challenge as youth unemployment, yet 
given its certainty and the fact that the family has been 
the main institution of inter-generational support it is 
important to refine social policy measures that would 
improve family’s budget constraint and its ability to 
manage intra-family transfer and inter-generational 
support that changes through the life cycle of a family. 
It is worth bearing in mind that the youth who are 
unemployed or in education are currently supported 
by parents who will be the elderly member of the 
family in the future. 
However, there is no guarantee that inter-
generational support will necessarily extend to the care 
of the future elderly.  Migration and changing family 
structure away from multi-generational households 
to nuclear families, as elsewhere in the world, have 
weakened inter-generational support within families. 
That is why pension policies and long term care for the 
‘very old’ have been on the agenda in the debate on 
ageing. Pensions in the MENA countries are generally 
a prerogative of state employees and larger companies 
in the formal sector. 
Development of a two-tier pension scheme could 
help with vulnerability in old age, especially for those 
in the informal sector and those who are not in the 
market-based labour force, yet are an important and 
indispensable source of labour in the non-market and 
household based work. The latter group would cover 
the great majority of the women who in the MENA 
have one of the lowest labour force participation rates 
in the world and therefore excluded from most of the 
labour-market based social protection schemes. Tier 
one could be designed as a pay-as-you go tax or social 
insurance contribution based scheme that is open to 
all residents, irrespective of citizenship rights, that in 
part will also provide some old age protection to the 
immigrant workers. Tier two could be a fully funded 
contribution based scheme that again should be open 
to all residents irrespective of citizenship status. Tier 
one is effectively a social protection floor for the old 
age. Tier two provides extra support in old age and 
could be based on compulsory membership and 
contribution, or could be combined with tax incentives 
to encourage membership. The long established 
assumption of myopia and poor planning for old age 
underpins the ‘coercive’ logic of nudging people to 
enroll in tier two type pension schemes. 
Policy makers in the MENA need to put social 
policy at the heart of any strategy to manage long-term 
impacts of demographic transition. The region does 
not have the extensive social and economic structures 
of the richer developed countries, which went through 
their demographic transition at a slower pace and with 
more resources. Yet the region has at least a 20-year 
window to develop and implement policies to manage 
its demographic transition. 
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